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Background: Cervical cancer disproportionately burdens disadvantaged women. Organised cervical screening aims
to make cancer prevention available to all women in a population, yet screening uptake and cancer incidence and
mortality are strongly correlated with socioeconomic status (SES). Reaching underscreened populations is a stated
priority in many screening programs, usually with an emphasis on something like ‘equity’. Equity is a poorly defined
and understood concept. We aimed to explain experts’ perspectives on how cervical screening programs might
justifiably respond to ‘the underscreened’.
Methods: This paper reports on a grounded theory study of cervical screening experts involved in program
organisation. Participants were 23 experts from several countries and a range of backgrounds: gynecology;
epidemiology; public health; pathology; general practice; policy making. Data were gathered via semi-structured
interview and concepts developed through transcript coding and memo writing.
Results: Most experts expressed an intuitive commitment to reducing systematic differences in screening
participation or cancer outcomes. They took three different implicit positions, however, on what made organised
programs justifiable with respect to underscreened populations. These were: 1) accepting that population screening
is likely to miss certain disenfranchised groups for practical and cultural reasons, and focusing on maximising
mainstream reach; 2) identifying and removing barriers to screening; and 3) providing parallel tailored screening
services that attended to different cultural needs. Positions tended to fall along country of practice lines.
Conclusions: Experts emphasised the provision of opportunity for underscreened populations to take up screening.
A focus on opportunity appeared to rely on tacit premises not supported by evidence: that provision of meaningful
opportunity leads to increased uptake, and that increased uptake of an initial screening test by disadvantaged
populations would decrease cervical cancer incidence and mortality. There was little attention to anything other
than the point of testing, or the difficulties disadvantaged women can have in accessing follow up care. The
different approaches to ‘improving equity’ taken by participants are differently justified, and differently justifiable,
but none attend directly to the broader conditions of disadvantage.
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Cervical cancer is not an equal opportunity cancer. It is
a disease that disproportionately burdens disadvantaged
ethnic minorities and women living in poverty in afflu-
ent countries, and the poorest women in poor countries
[1–4]. Acknowledging population disparities in cervical
cancer incidence is not new; cervical cancer has a long
reputation of being a disease that disproportionately af-
fects women of low socioeconomic status (SES) [1, 4–7].
Much of this cancer incidence is, in theory, preventable.
Screening and vaccination programs aim to prevent or
detect the human papillomavirus (HPV) infection that,
in rare cases, leads to cervical cancer. The availability and
organisation of cervical cancer prevention varies consider-
ably. In some well-resourced countries both primary and
secondary prevention methods are widely available and
free to women, in others they are easily accessible to those
who can pay for them or are insured. In less well-
resourced countries access tends to be more limited and
also dependent on capacity to pay [8, 9].
Organised cervical screening programs aim to provide
optimally efficient and effective screening to a popula-
tion. Where such programs are in place, women are
likely to be informed about, invited, and encouraged to
attend cervical screening. Testing in organised programs
may be provided at low or no cost, though funding
arrangements vary, and efforts are made to provide the
service in all geographic regions covered by a program.
However while organised programs aim to provide
equality of opportunity, equality of outcome is rarely
achieved. Disparities in screening uptake also exist; even
in countries with equal and free access to screening
there have been differences in uptake along SES lines
with testing rates decreasing as SES decreases [1, 3, 10].
Despite extensive research on underscreened populations
and the barriers to participation those communities face
[11–13], discrepancies in uptake remain [8, 14]. Screening
those women less likely to be screened – the
‘underscreened’ or the ‘hard to reach’ – remains a stated
priority for many cervical screening programs. Disparities
do not end with uptake however: rates of follow up of
abnormal findings reflect the SES trends that shape the
initial screening encounter; that is, the lower the SES the
less likely a woman is to receive appropriate follow up care
following an abnormal screening result [15–17].
A focus on uptake and on the underscreened
It is not uncommon for public health interventions to be
based on broadly utilitarian reasoning, with the stated goal
of optimising aggregated health outcomes at the popula-
tion level within available resources. This is reflected in
the way program successes are reported; in the case of
cervical screening a decrease in population cervical cancer
incidence over time is a mark of a successful program.Many screening programs also set high targets for screen-
ing uptake; in the United States, for example, the goal is
that 93 % of women will be screened at least once every
3 years [18]. Where targets are not set at the population
level, screening targets at the level of individual primary
practice may be set and incentivised [19, 20]. These mea-
sures loosely reflect a utilitarian logic: the idea that screen-
ing as many women as possible is likely to produce the
greatest aggregated population benefit, i.e. the greatest
decrease in cervical cancer incidence over time. As is
well-recognised, such utilitarian reasoning tends not to
focus on who benefits, or how benefit or burden are dis-
tributed in the population.
In the case of cervical screening, however, differences
in which subpopulations participate in the program are
marked. As a result, in the cervical screening literature it
is common for increasing uptake and attending to social
disparities in uptake to be presented as dual linked goals,
for example: “Increased efforts are needed to achieve
targets and reduce screening disparities” [18]. However
achieving targets and reducing disparities, respectively,
may require different approaches and different ways of
conceptualising the role of population based screening.
The goal of the first is to maximise the number of
women screened in a population. The goal of the second
is to ensure there are not systematic differences between
who is screened and who is not. The usual response in
the literature to both of these goals is to promote
higher screening uptake, whether in the population as a
whole for the purpose of reaching targets or in specific
groups who have been identified as underscreened for
the purpose of reducing disparity [9, 21–23]. In the cer-
vical screening literature, reducing disparity is often
referred to in terms of increasing equity or something
like it [9, 24, 25]. In what follows we will argue that the
public health ethics literature on equity and related
concepts would suggest that increasing equity may
require more than simply focusing on uptake.
‘Equity’ in health
It is not entirely clear what it means to say that focusing
on the ‘hard to reach’ is important in cervical screening,
or in public health more generally. Many approaches to
public health ethics emphasise something like the inter-
related concepts of justice, equity, and/or fairness. Much
of the discussion of justice-related concepts and their roles
in public health ethics has not necessarily increased clar-
ity; seminal and often cited definitions of, for example,
what constitutes inequity in health do not necessarily shed
light on meaning. Definitions are often somewhat circular:
equity is sometimes described as being about fairness and
justice [26] or, for example, “health equity” defined as
“social justice in health” [27]. Others claim that social in-
equality is a key determinant of health and that differential
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[28, 29]. Problematically, then, such definitions rest on the
reader’s own understanding of what these very large con-
cepts –fairness, justice – might mean [26, 30]. White-
head’s seminal definition says that “[t]he term “inequity”
… refers to differences which are unnecessary and avoid-
able, but in addition are considered unfair and unjust”
[31] (italics in original). Criticisms of Whitehead’s ap-
proach focus on the dynamism of what might be con-
sidered necessary and unavoidable. Neither are fixed
categories, and both are subject to their changing social
and political contexts. Whether or not a condition is
considered avoidable can have much to do with how
‘risky’ behaviour is perceived, or the status of techno-
logical innovations that might be available to ameliorate
difference in some situations but not others [30, 32, 33].
It is these definitions that tend to be used in the public
health literature, leaving public health professionals with
a strong intuitive commitment to something like equity
or justice but no agreed explicit understanding of what
that is or what it might entail. Some of the current just-
ice literature attempts to build more robust conceptions
of justice in health; much of this revolves around the
question of what makes a discrepancy in health out-
comes unfair. Preda and Voigt, for example, argue that
much of what is called ‘inequity’ in the social determi-
nants of health (SDOH) literature relies on insufficiently
examined normative assumptions, and that a focus on
health in what they call the “health equity through social
change” model detracts from any ultimate goal of in-
creasing social justice [32]. Responses to their paper take
mixed stances. Goldberg supports their position, arguing
that a lack of attention to the basis for SDOH discourses
can lead to empty slogans about health disparities [34].
Others disagree, stating that improved health is a suffi-
cient end in itself and that it is not the role of public
health to address social inequities except as they pertain
to health outcomes [35, 36]. Preda and Voigt’s response
questions the idea of a special role for health that war-
rants its separate consideration, and they call for more
work to be done to strengthen the basis for normative
claims of unfairness in the SDOH literature [37].
Fairness, notwithstanding its competing conceptualisa-
tions, seems to be considered a salve for health injustice
or inequity. Once it has been ascertained that a disparity
is unfair, it must be decided what, if any corrective activ-
ities need to take place such that unfairness will be
avoided or redressed. This involves identifying the end
goal of attending to patterns of difference in health. For
some the goal lies with the genuine opportunity for
people to live or act in accordance with their values
[38–40]. Proponents of this model hold that different
health outcomes can be the result of different values, so
opportunities are taken to matter more than outcomes.If everyone has genuine opportunities to access the condi-
tions that produce good health, then equity or something
like it is achieved whether or not health outcomes are
identical. For others concerned with socially-determined
disparities in health, it is outcomes that provide a measure
of fairness or similar. Outcomes may be in the form of
sufficient levels of health [41], the de-clustering of disad-
vantage [42], a reduction in health distribution gaps [43],
or other measures of well-being that provide a measure of
fairness or similar.
Maxwell Smith, in a recent examination of justice and
health equity, highlights the indeterminacy of how just-
ice is conceptualised [30]. He argues that this lack of
clarity carries through into the use of ideas like equity
and justice in public health policy making, and calls for
empirical studies that examine how public health policy
makers understand justice and its related concepts. This
is one such study. We interviewed experts involved in
establishing, updating or administering organised cer-
vical screening programs in order to answer our research
questions: (How) did experts talk about social disparities
in cervical screening? What, if any, was considered the
best way of overcoming these disparities? Many of the
experts we interviewed talked about the need to reduce
disparities in screening and the role of equity or some-
thing like it in cervical screening. However, as we will
show, there was considerable variation in experts’ nor-
mative conceptions and evaluations of equity in cervical
screening. We describe the different positions experts
took on underscreened populations and, in the discus-
sion, contextualise them in the screening pathway and in
public health ethics more widely.
Methods
This study was carried out using grounded theory
methods of sampling, data collection and analysis [44,
45]. Organised cervical screening brings together people
from many disciplines: pathology; gynaecology; general
practice, epidemiology; public health; and public policy.
As part of a study into how Australia’s organised cervical
screening program came to be the way it is, we purpos-
ively sampled experts from these professional back-
grounds who were publically identifiable as a result of
their work in organising cervical screening in Australia.
As data analysis progressed we developed concepts that
explained organisation in Australia; we sought to test
these against interviews with cervical screening experts
working in other countries. We theoretically sampled
experts who had been involved in guideline setting pri-
marily in New Zealand because of the relatively similar
demographics and health care systems and then further
sought out experts from other countries.
Approximately half of the experts we approached
agreed to participate in the study. In total we conducted
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written commentary via email from one more expert
who declined to be interviewed. Permission was given
for the contents of that email to be included in the
study. Of the 23 participating experts, 14 had worked
primarily in Australia, five primarily in New Zealand,
and four we characterise as ‘international’ given their
breadth of experience. 17 participants had worked in or
consulted to cervical screening programs in countries
not their own, including programs in North America,
Europe, South America, and Asia. Experts had experience
of organising cervical screening over a range of time pe-
riods (1980s–2010s). Ethics approval was obtained by the
Cancer Institute New South Wales Human Research
Ethics Committee (HREC/12/CIPHS/46) and the Univer-
sity of Sydney Ethics Committee (#15245).
Interviews were conducted in person and by tele-
phone or Skype by JW and lasted between 35 and
107 min, median 53 min. Telephone interviews have
been shown empirically to provide data of comparable
quantity and quality to face to face interviews [46]. In-
terviews were recorded (except for one where the inter-
viewee requested that the interview not be recorded
but gave permission for notes to be taken and used as
data), de-identified and transcribed verbatim. Data were
analysed as we went in order to facilitate comparison
with earlier interviews and to help shape question
routes. Questions were altered as the study progressed
and to ensure each interview was responsive to the ex-
perience of the particular participant. A sample ques-
tion route is available in Additional file 1. JW wrote
memos after each interview and again after each tran-
script was coded, also to facilitate comparison. As we
identified something resembling equity as a frequently
occurring concept in the data, we began to build a
memo around this concept and refined it as we sam-
pled theoretically.
Representative quotes are included in this paper for
their illustrative value. Details in quotes that do not
affect meaning have been slightly altered to ensure the
speaker cannot be identified. Due to the relatively small
pool of cervical screening experts in many countries we
do not include potentially identifying demographic infor-
mation such as profession or country of practice along-
side the quotes in this paper.
Results
The central concern for most experts in this study was en-
suring that as many women as possible were screened. To
this end, they considered that a major benefit of organised
screening was its potential to maximise the uptake of cer-
vical screening in the population via the wide distribution
of the initial screening encounter. Experts also acknowl-
edged disparities in cervical screening access and cancerincidence. Most experts had an intuitive but undefined
sense that it was important to narrow sociodemographic
differences in cervical screening and cancer; however this
was held more strongly by some experts than others.
There were two assumptions behind experts’ talk about
screening distribution: 1) that if there was a meaningful
opportunity to be screened, women would take it up;
and 2) that increased uptake of an initial screening en-
counter by traditionally underscreened groups would
lead to less SES-based difference in screening rates and
thus benefit. That is, experts appeared to presume that
women would screen if they could, and that higher up-
take by underscreened groups would subsequently lead
to less cervical cancer in those groups, reducing or re-
moving cervical cancer disparities.
Experts took one of three implicit positions on what
makes a justifiable organised cervical screening program
When experts talked about underscreened populations,
they did so with a view to increasing participation in
screening programs. They took, broadly, one of three posi-
tions on how to best achieve this in order to improve what
they usually referred to as ‘equity’. The first position fo-
cused on wide geographic availability of ‘mainstream’
screening services, the second on the removal of practical
barriers to the access of mainstream screening services,
and the third on tailoring screening services to make them
more culturally appealing to different sub-populations.
We discuss these positions below, along with the geo-
graphic patterns we observed in the positions experts took
on disparity.
Position one: Maximise aggregated benefit by making the
same services available in all geographic areas
A minority of experts took a loosely utilitarian perspec-
tive on the goals of screening, promoting the view that
utility could be maximised by ensuring all women had
access to screening services. For these experts, screen-
ing was about maximising aggregated health via maxi-
mising screening in the population within existing
parameters. This approach did not presume that abso-
lutely all women would or should be screened. In
simple utilitarian reasoning, there is generally an ac-
ceptance that failure to benefit a minority, or even
harming a minority, is justifiable, as long as aggregated
utility is maximised overall. In this case, it was accepted
that there would always be a minority of women who
would not be screened, and so would not receive any
possible benefits of screening. Because this was both
seen to be inevitable and thought not to undermine
overall utility, it was considered (tacitly) ethically justi-
fiable. It was assumed that there were two types of
women who would inevitably not participate in cervical
screening. The first were those who were completely
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Expert 12:
“Um, I mean, from a clinician’s point of view the
cancers we see now are new migrants, um - - - the
crazy people, the schizophrenics, the - the ostracised
from the health system, the people who’ve got no real
connection to the health system, um, I think – I think
– I think the cancers that I’m seeing still, no screening
program is ever going to impact.”
The second group was women who were less likely to
participate for cultural reasons:
“If women are not well-informed, or services are not
properly available to them, these are things that can
and should be fixed. Ultimately, though, we will get to
a number of people. I mean, it’s entirely understand-
able that immigrants – recent immigrants from
Pakistan, where the culture is no, you don’t show your
private parts to anybody - - - ah, you know, we aren’t
going to change them. Ah, it’s – it’s right and proper
they’re allowed to keep their, ah, cultural beliefs.”
(Expert 19)
Both of these causes of non-participation were assumed
to be relatively intractable. That is, overcoming them
would be extremely difficult and thus expensive (carry a
high opportunity cost and so undermine overall utility), as
well as possibly requiring the violation of other tacit
normative commitments such as, for example, respect for
cultural difference. Therefore, a justifiable program was
one that: ensured that services were available in all geo-
graphic locations, and that standardised information was
consistently communicated, without making special efforts
to reach women who were highly unlikely to participate.
Position two: Reach underscreened populations by
removing practical barriers to screening
The majority of experts considered that offering the
same service in all geographic areas was not sufficient to
engage underscreened populations, and that screening
programs had an obligation to provide effective oppor-
tunities for participation to all women. Of this majority,
most experts advocated for identifying barriers to main-
stream services and removing them to improve accessi-
bility (Position Two). The basis for this view was that all
women do not have the same capacity to access main-
stream services and that the opportunity to participate
was therefore not the same for all women. Providing ef-
fective opportunity to participate in screening meant
identifying a range of barriers to access that might be
experienced by some women; these tend to be factors
such as: cost; fear; or availability of female screeners.Responses to these barriers might involve practical
changes, such as cost removal, or informational and edu-
cational interventions such as translation of standardised
materials into different languages or information ses-
sions for community groups. One expert gave examples
of how health system arrangements could inadvertently
make screening more difficult for some women than
others: “I think, you know, we need to deal with those
accessibility issues that people face … you know, make
sure it’s free for everyone and that it can be provided by
women … and not prohibiting things like practice nurses
being able to do it.” (Expert 3) Removal of barriers
would mean that services were not only available in all
geographic areas, but that more women would have a
genuine opportunity to access these services, and thus
the program would become more ‘equitable’. For this
group a justifiable program was one in which: any
woman, regardless of her circumstances, has the same
effective access to screening as any other woman, because
all identified barriers to accessing mainstream services
had been removed for all women.
Position three: Reach underscreened populations by
culturally tailoring screening services
A third, minority, view was that the program or screen-
ing service itself should be tailored by offering separate,
different, screening arrangements for identified groups
of women in tandem with mainstream services offered
to the population. The aim of this approach was to meet
the needs of women whose non-participation was for
cultural, rather than practical or knowledge-based, rea-
sons. This view was based on the same premise as that
used by experts supporting barrier removal, that all
women should not only have cervical screening services
geographically available, but should also be able to ef-
fectively access screening. They agreed that the removal
of barriers is necessary to encourage access to main-
stream services, but contended that this approach was
insufficient to ensure that all women could effectively
access screening. Instead they argued that particular
groups of women had specific needs that could only be
addressed by the provision of tailored services that de-
parted from the mainstream. Expert 7 provided exam-
ples of how service provision could more meaningfully
meet needs of under-screened groups: “But, ah, they set
up a lot of training courses for nurses and for lay smear-
takers. And that was a special issue amongst [a particu-
lar cultural group] … “Um, the other thing to say is that
there was a great anxiety amongst [this group] about a
compulsory register. So it was set up so there was a
different sort of approach to [their] data.” Other experts
talked about the possibility for underscreened women
to access self-administered HPV tests, rather than at-
tend mainstream services. When experts used the word
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something like: a program in which any woman, regard-
less of her circumstances, has the same effective access
to screening as any other woman, because different ser-
vices are provided in parallel to address the different
needs of different groups of women.
A fourth view
One expert had a view that differed from all of these po-
sitions but was associated with aspects of both Positions
One and Three. Expert 14 agreed that screening had to
be made culturally relevant before women could be ex-
pected to participate, but also agreed with the view that
cervical screening was not a service that could necessar-
ily be relevant to the whole population: “I also think that
for some of these people, there will be like this weird ex-
perience, where, you know, the children in the community
are glue sniffing and there is a high rate of diabetes and
chlamydia … equity would say [screening] it should be
there but it is probably not at the top of their list of, you
know, health concerns” (Expert 14). This expert advo-
cated for seeing cervical screening as relatively minor
part of a bigger public health picture; screening was a
‘nice to have’, but it was primarily the job of public
health to attend to health needs that women in vulner-
able communities would identify themselves as pressing
and currently being experienced. A justifiable program
in this outlier view was one where: other health needs
were consistently and reliably met such that preventive
care such as cervical screening would come to have
relevance to women’s lives.
Geographic patterning in expert positions
We noted a pattern in how experts talked about responses
to social disparities in cervical cancer and hypothesise that
experts’ considerations of equity are formed at least in part
by the socio-political discourses that shape public health
norms and priorities. The Australian experts we inter-
viewed tended to talk about the difficulties of providing
services in remote geographical areas; that is, they were
on the whole more focused on the practical difficulties as-
sociated with screening access (as is a consideration for all
service delivery in Australia) and took Position One or
Two. Position Two was the most common and had
broad geographical representation. New Zealand ex-
perts tended to take Position Three, most commonly in
the context of the importance of respecting Māori
(indigenous) culture; this position is reflected in that
country’s cervical screening policy: “In practice, a
service can be judged to be equitable ‘when people are
treated in as fair a manner as possible by ignoring
irrelevant differences between them, but taking into
account relevant differences.’ In New Zealand there is a
diverse range of cultural groups, and cultural factorscan be relevant differences. Thus, a screening programme
needs to operate from a cultural context that makes sense
to participants” [46, 47]. There was some Canadian
support for Position Three, also in the context of talk-
ing about indigenous women.
Discussion
Experts’ talk about underscreened populations and
‘equity’ in the context of cervical screening was explicitly
focused on the opportunity to take up initial screening.
This is not unexpected – interviewees were cervical
screening experts and the topic of interviews was orga-
nised cervical screening. A belief in the worth and value
of screening as an activity underpinned their work and
this was reflected in their views about the importance of
raising screening rates for traditionally underscreened or
heard to reach groups. In this discussion we situate ex-
perts’ talk about reaching underscreened women in the
literature and in public health more widely. This paper
is an example of empirical bioethics. We consider ex-
perts’ views through the lens of the normative literature
while also using their accounts to identify gaps in that
literature. From this we draw conclusions for how ex-
perts’ views and silences can inform thinking about ‘hard
to reach’ groups in cervical screening.
Situating experts’ views in the literature
Smith calls for empirical work that explores public
health practitioners’ normative assumptions about what
might constitute health equity [30]. Our analysis shows
that cervical screening experts took three alternative po-
sitions on what a just cervical screening program looked
like. Two of these positions emphasised reducing differ-
ences in participation rates among different population
groups by targeting those groups for special treatment.
Special treatment was intended to lift screening rates in
typically underscreened groups to bring them more in
line with general population rates. Here we look at the
positions in turn.
In an ‘maximise aggregated benefit by making standar-
dised services available in all geographic areas’ scenario,
a screening program had an obligation to meet certain
conditions universally—especially a standardised geo-
graphically accessible service and the provision of ad-
equate information—but was not obliged to screen all
women. These experts provided justifications for their
position. First, some women had more immediate health
concerns, or cultures or values that contraindicated va-
ginal examinations, and so cervical screening might
quite reasonably be seen as irrelevant by them. Taking
measures to encourage these women to be screened
would involve the commitment of significant resources;
persuading truly recalcitrant non-screeners to partici-
pate in screening is an expensive proposition, and so
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simply a question of unnecessary expense but also one
of cultural appropriateness – if a woman had a deeply
held reason for not participating that was based on cul-
tural or religious belief then it was not the role of the
program to interfere with those beliefs.
Because the experts holding ‘maximise utility’ views
considered a certain amount of non-participation in
screening programs to be inevitable, they viewed special
efforts to reach underscreened populations as largely fu-
tile. From this perspective, arguments against special
treatment on the grounds of cost implications and cul-
tural appropriateness have some credibility. Cervical
screening that uses high-quality cytology is expensive,
particularly in organised programs such as Australia’s
that encourage screening more frequently than every
3 years or from a young age [48]. Additional costs to the
program may deem it cost-ineffective. To the issue of
cultural intractability, many liberal traditions, including
some associated with utilitarian reasoning, would recog-
nise the moral importance of not coercing citizens to act
against their own values, even if that reduced the utility
afforded by a public program such as cancer screening.
This would ordinarily be argued on some version of the
utility and/or fundamental moral importance of the lib-
erty of individual citizens [49] (Ch6). With that said,
justifications for providing a service and information
that are known to appeal to a majority but not an iden-
tifiable minority do not respond adequately to the fol-
lowing problems.
Cervical cancer disproportionately burdens already-
disadvantaged women. This means that certain people in
society, by virtue of their cultural or socioeconomic pos-
ition, are less able to avoid a higher risk of cervical cancer.
Arguing the justifiability of a screening program from a
moral position that is largely disinterested in distribution
seems to inadequately respond to the very character of
cervical cancer, and thus seems to be problematic. If we
accept that cervical cancer is a burdensome and usually
avoidable disease that disproportionately affects the least
well off, and that we have good reasons to prefer interven-
tions that are likely to benefit the least well off more than
the most well off [41] (ch6), then a justifiable cervical
screening program is likely to specifically attend to the
needs of the populations that are most likely to benefit.
What is not clear is what the resulting program might
look like. We now turn to the strengths and shortcomings
of the approaches favoured by Positions Two and Three.
The second approach, identifying and removing bar-
riers that are known to undermine access to screening,
is an attempt to address the systematic nature of the
disparities seen in screening uptake. The justifiability of
barrier removal as means of improving equity, or some-
thing like it, depends to an extent on what the goal of theintervention is considered to be. Alternative goals could
be, for example, 1) to provide meaningful opportunity to
participate in screening regardless of background; or 2) to
narrow SES-based disparities in screening participation or
cancer outcomes. There is a tension between opportunity
and outcome here. Experts’ talk focused on the import-
ance of women being able to access screening irrespective
of their circumstances, implying an opportunity focus.
As previously shown, Position One assumes it is ac-
ceptable to exclude some women from opportunities to
participate in a program ostensibly designed to benefit
the population of women. The strategy of removing bar-
riers implicitly rejects this view, seeking to remove those
things that impede opportunity (such as payment, being
examined by a man, or not speaking English). This
seems intuitively attractive. Ensuring opportunity in this
way, however, does not appear to reliably change the
uneven distribution of cancer.
If barrier removal was effective in improving participa-
tion, and if this participation had an effect on cancer in-
cidence, it should be possible to demonstrate reduction
of cervical cancer incidence and mortality in targeted
populations over the longer term when barriers are re-
moved. That evidence, however, is not available: the lit-
erature on barrier removal instead reports on whether
removing barriers increases screening uptake in tar-
geted populations. Unfortunately, the majority of stud-
ies do not show evidence of effectiveness by an
increased uptake measure [50–53]. Note here that we
are not claiming that barrier removal does not de-
crease cancer incidence or mortality. Rather, we are
claiming that, as yet, the literature has not clearly dem-
onstrated that barrier removal decreases incidence or
mortality. The evidence that exists comes from myriad
small, population-specific evaluations which are un-
likely to be included in aggregated studies, making
conclusions difficult to draw. Studies that look at the
screening pathway are needed. It is not yet clear the
extent to which increased access leads to increased
uptake, whether that increased uptake correlates with
follow up, or the extent to which diagnoses stemming
from that follow up are adequately treated.
If this view of the evidence is accepted, it presents a
challenge for the view that opportunity to screen should
be the most important indicator of a just program. If
equitable opportunity to screen is to be accepted as the
indicator of whether a program is just, then one of two
things would be needed. First, the opportunity position
could be supported by evidence that the removal of bar-
riers is in fact providing women with a real opportunity
to consider whether screening is right for them. It is
plausible that women may be presented with a meaning-
ful opportunity, decide that screening is not right for
them, and decline the offer. This could conceivably be a
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barrier removal interventions. However, evidence of this
is currently lacking. Second, in the absence of such evi-
dence, the opportunity argument would need to be sup-
ported by better reasoning about why opportunity
should matter, if that opportunity appears not to influ-
ence uptake, and the ultimate goal of the program is
uptake.
This brings us to the third approach, changing screen-
ing services to better appeal to specific underscreened
groups. This approach recognised that in some instances
the service offered to the population was not a service
that some groups of women would use for cultural rea-
sons, irrespective of attempts to make it easy to use.
This third group of interviewees considered providing
services that are relevant to all sub-populations to be a
political and moral imperative. It should be noted that
the majority of experts taking this view emphasised the
cultural needs of indigenous women in particular. In this
approach the means of achieving higher uptake or nar-
rowing the gap in screening rates (cultural tailoring) was
not just an instrumental good. It also had intrinsic value,
contributing to self-determination. Position Three experts
thought this valuing of culture made a program more
justifiable.
Catriona Mackenzie has defined self-determination as
follows. “Self-determination involves having the freedom
and opportunities to make and enact choices of practical
import to one’s life. … Opportunity conditions [for self-
determination] specify the kinds of opportunities that
need to be available to agents in their social environ-
ments for them to have choices about what to value,
what to be, and what to do” [54] (p17). Public health in-
terventions that take cultural specificities into account
seem more likely to promote the circumstances neces-
sary for the realisation of self-determination because
they indicate that difference is respected and valued, and
they seem likely to be developed in conjunction with or
by representatives of the groups in question [55]. Self-
determination is intrinsic to conceptions of health and
well-being in indigenous populations [56–58] as well as
being an identified component of autonomy more gener-
ally [54]. It is not clear whether or how well cultural tai-
loring increases uptake of screening services, because of
the way data are recorded or made available for analysis.
As such, the same arguments made around tensions be-
tween assessing opportunity, outcome and uptake for
Position Two, above, hold here too. Where an analysis
of the justifiability of Position Three could differ is in
considering the contribution its methods or basis in
cultural respect might make. Arguably, consultation with
marginalised minorities and any subsequent addition of
(non-mainstream) culturally specific practices to a popu-
lation service seems likely to produce goods other thanincreases in opportunity, screening uptake or disease
prevention. Position Three was based on at least some
degree of appreciation for cultural variation and political
will to value that variation. An additional, and difficult
to measure, outcome may be the good which accrues to
a marginalised population as a result of this recognition.
It is not only indigenous peoples who experience
cultural barriers to screening. Others, particularly im-
migrant groups, are also systematically disadvantaged.
Tailoring screening for these groups, however, was not
discussed in any depth in our interviews. In the litera-
ture, HPV self-testing is often suggested as a method of
overcoming cultural barriers that are connected to
modesty or discomfort more generally with vaginal ex-
aminations [59–62]. This approach, prima facie, should
have potential in providing a culturally acceptable alter-
native. However, if it is introduced without consultation
with traditionally underscreened groups, as sometimes
appears to be the case [63], self-determination benefits
seem likely to be less.
Situating cervical screening in public health
Experts’ talk about reaching the underscreened focused
on the provision of effective opportunities to participate
in screening programs for all women. There are a num-
ber of assumptions that underpinned their positions: 1.
that preventive health measures could be made relevant
and appealing to all women; 2. that effective opportunity
to be screened would convert to uptake; and 3. that in-
crease in the uptake of an initial test would convert to
less disparity in cervical cancer incidence and mortality.
We discuss each of these in turn.
Can cervical screening be made relevant to everyone?
There was a broad inclination, as Positions Two and
Three describe, towards attempts to make cervical screen-
ing effectively accessible or relevant by removing barriers
to participation or providing alternative screening services.
It is likely, however, that for some women it might not be
identifiable practical or cultural misalignment that pre-
vents them from being screened but chaotic lives or im-
mediate health needs that make preventive care seem
immaterial, irrespective of attempts to make it so. Suffi-
cientarian models of justice suggest that we should ensure
that all members of a society meet a threshold level of
wellbeing [41, 64], justified largely by the idea that it is not
the gap between poverty and affluence that is troubling,
but the conditions of poverty themselves. Such arguments
suggest that a baseline level of wellbeing may be necessary
before it is possible for cervical screening, or health
screening generally, to make sense as an offering. This
approach reflects the position taken by the outlier expert,
the fourth view described in the results section. Arguably,
a public health service, broadly conceived, might have
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level of wellbeing before it tries to offer them screening. If
this is accepted, it may not be screening uptake or less
screening disparity per se that should be measures of
health equity. Rather, the achievement of a general level of
wellbeing in the lives of all women, such that the oppor-
tunity to participate in screening seems relevant to them,
may be a better indicator of health equity [65].
Opportunity and uptake: the obligation to screen
The literature reports that members of the public may
believe there is an obligation to access available cancer
screening services [66, 67]. Because the success of
screening programs is measured in part by uptake, such
that financial incentives are offered to screeners to reach
particular screening targets, screening is likely to be
communicated to the public in a persuasive manner
[68]. When programs have an implicit goal of maximis-
ing utility, all participants are imagined to be roughly
identical and offering standardised services is seen to be
the most efficient and so the most utility maximising.
Women in traditionally underscreened groups seem
more likely to perceive that service as irrelevant to them,
perhaps because they are the most likely to be different
than the imagined “standard” woman that these pro-
grams are targeting. We can speculate that as particular
groups of women are targeted via practical or cultural
avenues, a shared perception of obligation to screen may
increase. This could be for a number of reasons. 1)
Screening programmers could have a stronger desire to
make sure that money spent on tailored screening is not
‘wasted’ and might promote services accordingly in the
belief that participation is important for both women
and the public purse. 2) Services may seem more rele-
vant and more appealing to the groups they target, creat-
ing a new shared perception of screening as a social
norm. 3) Targeting may also stimulate a sense of reci-
procity – if usually disenfranchised groups are offered a
special service they may feel a sense of owing something
in exchange for the efforts made to include them, or in
the hope other types of offers might be made.
There are two conflicting ethical imperatives at play
with expending special efforts to particular populations
to provide meaningful opportunity to participate in
screening. A heightened sense of obligation to undergo
screening may be problematic when it comes to meeting
conditions for consent because it may undermine the
ideal of voluntary choice on the part of consumers that
is intended to underpin informed consent [69, 70]. How-
ever as we have discussed, a program that is not per-
ceived as accessible or relevant to certain sections of the
population is also morally difficult to justify, particularly
when it is least relevant to the very people it is most
likely to benefit. This tension is unlikely to be resolvablebut it might be mitigated by closely attending to how
opportunities are communicated. One way of supporting
valid consent for screening is known as the ‘consider an
offer’ approach [70]. It suggests being explicit about the
benefits and harms of a test and the appropriateness of
that test for the individual in question. It also recom-
mends being explicit about the organisation behind the
testing – who is making the offer? Do they have any-
thing to gain from people’s participation? – and commu-
nicating non-compulsion and the availability of further
information if it is desired. While the ‘consider an offer’
approach seems likely to support consent for screening
there is also the chance that, given the explicit option,
women will decide not to participate, which remains a
difficult tension for screening programs.
Uptake and cancer: the Pap test in the screening pathway
As cervical screening needs contextualising in public
health, so does the Pap test (or HPV DNA test, or other
initial screening test) need to be seen in the context of
the wider screening pathway. While special attention to
traditionally underscreened groups might increase up-
take of an initial screening encounter, that test can only
indicate normal or heightened risk. For that risk to be
reduced there must be investigation and, where indi-
cated, treatment. Women who are unlikely to participate
in mainstream screening are also less likely to take up
recommended diagnostic services and treatment, indi-
cating perceived or actual barriers to participation in
some screening programs that go beyond the initial test
[15–17, 60]. Therefore increasing screening uptake and
the identification of increased risk do not necessarily
mean removal of that risk, or improved cervical cancer
outcomes. Yet the focus of many organised screening
programs, and all of the experts we interviewed, was
participation in the initial screening encounter only,
which means significant effort and resources put into a
test that may produce distress rather than health. It is
not clear why experts did not talk about the full screen-
ing pathway in interviews, but the same tendency is true
of this literature. Barriers to initial screening tests re-
ceive full and frequent attention; socially-based discrep-
ancies in follow up of women with abnormal results
much less so [16]. Neglecting to talk about the full
screening pathway may be just as responsible for the
ongoing SES-based disparities in the distribution of
cervical cancer as discrepancies in screening uptake.
What this paper adds to the justice literature
Our analysis shows that experts working on developing
and implementing cervical screening programs tend to
agree, prima facie, that there is an ‘equity problem’ with
cervical screening and cervical cancer, but also tend to
disagree on whether or how to address it. We began this
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erature regarding equity and justice is somewhat circular,
and may be unhelpful for people involved in thinking
practically about situations involving ‘social’ health dif-
ferences. Cervical screening is a clear example of ‘social’
health difference: the same patterns of disadvantage in
cervical cancer incidence appear to be replicated to a
greater or lesser extent across many populations. We
have shown that conceptions of what made a program
justifiable varied across experts, with quite different con-
sequences for the practical shape of the resulting pro-
gram. This variation suggests a lack of connection
between the literature on equity and justice and the
everyday work of screening experts. We would speculate
that this may be because the literature does not cur-
rently offer easily understood or applicable definitions of
these concepts. It is also possible that other, perhaps less
conceptually robust, resources offer a quicker and easier
apparent solution to the ‘equity problem’. In either of
these cases, it is not clear that fine tuning an ideal theory
of justice would assist experts involved in program de-
velopment. Their approaches to what made a justifiable
program were deeply contextualised in the programs
they had worked on and the patterns they had seen or
deduced. It might be that, for the purposes of both pub-
lic health ethics and public health practice, working out
how notions of equity and justice work in a practical
sense for a particular case is a more important task than
ideal theorising [71].
Conclusions
There was strong support among the experts we inter-
viewed for targeting underscreened groups in order to
provide better opportunities for screening; the same sup-
port is found in the cervical screening literature.
Broadly, it is assumed that providing meaningful oppor-
tunity to participate in screening will translate to actual
participation in screening and, presumably, improved
outcomes in cervical screening incidence and mortality
for traditionally underscreened groups. There is, how-
ever, no clear evidence of such outcomes. As a result we
are left with an intuitive sense that increased opportun-
ity is good but no clarity about whether that alleged
good makes any difference to women’s lives. Different
approaches to ‘improving equity’, as it was described by
participating experts, are differently justified, and differ-
ently justifiable, but none focus adequately on the big
picture. If cervical cancer is strongly associated with dis-
advantage, but screening is inevitably irrelevant to the
most disadvantaged, then the public health program of
which screening is part should arguably work to elimin-
ate those conditions that mean screening cannot even be
considered. Programs might also attend to the way
screening is communicated to make sure that increasedattention to some groups does not translate into an in-
creased sense of obligation to be screened. Finally, unless
there is attention to the full screening pathway it is diffi-
cult to see how providing even a genuine opportunity to
take up an offer of an initial screening encounter will
lead to improved cervical cancer outcomes.
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